Heuristics and Biases

The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Heuristics and Biases
  • Edited by Thomas Gilovich


    Edited by Dale Griffin


    Edited by Daniel Kahneman

  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press

    Online Publication Date:June 2012

    Online ISBN:9780511808098

    Hardback ISBN:9780521792608

    Paperback ISBN:9780521796798

  • Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808098

    Subjects: Cognition

Judgment pervades human experience. Do I have a strong enough case to go to trial? Will the Fed change interest rates? Can I trust this person? This book examines how people answer such questions. How do people cope with the complexities of the world economy, the uncertain behavior of friends and adversaries, or their own changing tastes and personalities? When are people's judgments prone to bias, and what is responsible for their biases? This book compiles psychologists' best attempts to answer these important questions.


 Reviews:

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment; offers a massive, state-of-the-art treatment of the literature, supplementing a similar book published two decades ago...This is an impressive book, full of implications for law and policy." Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School

"...the book should serve well as a reference work for researchers in cognitive science and as a textbook for advanced courses in that difficult topic. Philosophers interested in cognitive science will also wish to consult it." Metapsychology Online Review

"Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment is a scholarly treat, one that is sure to shape the perspectives of another generation of researchers, teachers, and graduate students. The book will serve as a welcome refresher course for some readers and a strong introduction to an important research perspective for others." Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology

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