Hilary Putnam


Hilary Putnam

This volume appraises the major philosophical contributions of Hilary Putnam (b. 1926) to the theory of meaning, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and mathematics, and moral theory. Concerned not only with the broad spectrum of problems addressed, it also details the transformations and restructuring his positions have undergone over the years. The analysis constitutes a critical introduction to central issues in contemporary philosophy, including quantum logic, realism, functionalism, the "mind as computer" metaphor, and the fact/value dichotomy.

Reference Title: References

Reference Type: reference-list

Putnam, Hilary (1975a). Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Putnam, Hilary (1975b). Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers, Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Putnam, Hilary (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
Putnam, Hilary (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Putnam, Hilary (1983). Realism and Reason, Philosophical Papers, Volume III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Putnam, Hilary (1988). Representation and Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Putnam, Hilary (1990). Realism with a Human Face, ed. James Conant. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Putnam, Hilary (1992). Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (The Gifford Lectures, St. Andrews 1990)
Putnam, Hilary (1994). Words and Life, ed. James Conant. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. A collection of essays by Putnam, selected and introduced by the editor
Putnam, Hilary (1999). The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: Columbia University Press
Putnam, Hilary (2002). The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Putnam, Hilary (2004). Ethics without Ontology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

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