The Sanctions Paradox

Economic Statecraft and International Relations

The Sanctions Paradox

The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies.


 Reviews:

"The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favorite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come." John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago

"The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favorite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come." John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago

"...there is much of interest in this book, and the case studies, particularly those concerning Russia and its neighbours, break valuable new ground." International Journal

"Drezner is nothing if not innovative." Jrnl of Ritual Studies

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