A Physicalist Manifesto

Thoroughly Modern Materialism

A Physicalist Manifesto

  • Provides the fullest formulation of a comprehensive physicalist view to date ^
  • Evaluates the empirical standing of physicalism in unprecedented detail
  • Self-contained and thesis-driven discussions, accessible to graduate and advanced undergraduate students, make it an ideal seminar text A Physicalist Manifesto is the fullest yet of the comprehensive physicalist view that, in some important sense, everything is physical. Andrew Melnyk argues that the view is best formulated by appeal to carefully worked-out notion of realization, rather than supervenience; that, so forumlated, physicalism must be importantly reductionist; that it need not repudiate causal and explanatory claims framed in non-physical language; and that it has the a posterior epistemic status of a broad-scope scientific hypothesis. Two concluding chapters argue in inprecedented detail that contemporary science provides no significant empirical evidence against physicalism and some considerable evidence for it. Written in brisk, candid and exceptionally clear style, this book should appeal to professionals and students in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of science.


     Reviews:

    "This is unquestionably the best elucidation and defense of physicalism as a general world view ever produced by a philospher." Michael Tye, The University of Texas at Austin

    "This excellent book by Andrew Melnyk is both timely and significant. It is timely because now is a good time to take stock of the physicalist debate over the past half century, and Melnyk does that with impressive systematicity and comprehensiveness. Moreover, the book is an important new contribution to that debate. Melnyk offers us a form of physicalism, "realization physicalism", that is robustly reductionist and yet non-eliminative - that is, reductive physicalism that respects the integrity of the casual/explanatory claims of the special sciences. Melnyk's physicalism is a far cry from the pale, insubstantial forms of nonreductive physicalism that have been dominant. One particulary valuable aspect of the book is its extensive coverage of the question of empirical support for physicalism. Here Melnyk goes far beyond those physicalism who take the attitude 'I say that mental states areR^ physical status - refute me if you can!'" Jaegwon Kim, Brown University

  • Reference Title: References

    Reference Type: reference-list

    Adams, Fred, and Ken Aizawa. 1994. “Fodorian Semantics.” In Stich and Warfield 1994: 223–42
    Alberts, B., D. Bray, J. Lewis, M. Raff, K. Roberts, and James D. Watson. 1994. Molecular Biology of the Cell. 3d ed. New York: Garland
    Alcock, James E. 1990. Science and Supernature: A Critical Appraisal of Parapsychology. Buffalo, N.J.: Prometheus Books
    Antony, Louise. 1991. “The Causal Relevance of the Mental: More on the Mattering of Minds.” Mind and Language 6: 295–327
    Antony, Louise, and Joseph Levine. 1997. “Reduction with Autonomy.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 11, Mind, Causation, and World, ed. James E. Tomberlin, 83–105. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
    Atkins, P. W. 1991. Atoms, Electrons, and Change. New York: Scientific American Library
    Atkins, P. W 1994. Physical Chemistry. 5th ed. New York: W. H. Freeman
    Atkins, P. W 1995. The Periodic Kingdom: A Journey into the Land of the Chemical Elements. New York: Basic Books
    Baker, Lynne R. 1997. “Why Constitution Is Not Identity.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 599–621
    Baker, Lynne R 1999. “Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution.” In Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 23, ed. Peter French, Theodore Uehling Jr., and Howard Wettstein, 144–65. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
    Barlow, Horace. 1998. “The Nested Networks of Brains and Minds.” In Bock and Goode 1998: 142–55
    Bealer, George. 1993. “Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality.” In Robinson 1993a: 101–26
    Bedau, Mark A.. 1992. “Where's the Good in Teleology?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 781–806
    Bedau, Mark A. 1993. “Naturalism and Teleology.” In Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, ed. Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner, 23–51. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press
    Bedau, Mark A. 1996. “The Nature of Life.” In Boden 1996: 332–57
    Bedau, Mark A. 1997. “Weak Emergence.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 11, Mind, Causation, and World, ed. James E. Tomberlin, 375–99. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
    Beloff, John. 1989. “Dualism: A Parapsychological Perspective.” In The Case for Dualism, ed. John R. Smythies and John Beloff, 167–85. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia
    Bickle, John. 1998. Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Blackmore, Susan. 1996. In Search of the Light: The Adventures of a Parapsychologist. Amherst, N.J.: Prometheus Books
    Block, Ned. 1997. “Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 11, Mind, Causation, and World, ed. James E. Tomberlin, 107–32. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
    Block, Ned, and Robert Stalnaker. 1999. “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.” Philosophical Review 108. 1: 1–46
    Bock, Gregory R., and Jamie A. Goode, eds. 1998. The Limits of Reductionism in Biology. New York: J. Wiley
    Boden, Margaret. 1990. The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. New York: Oxford University Press
    Boden, Margaret ed. 1996. The Philosophy of Artificial Life. New York: Oxford University Press
    Boyd, Richard. 1980. “Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1, ed. Ned Block, 268–305. London: Methuen
    Brenner, Sydney. 1998. “Biological Computation.” In Bock and Goode 1998: 106–11
    Brindley, Giles S. 1973. “Sensory Effects of Electrical Stimulation of the Visual and Paravisual Cortex in Man.” In Central Processing of Visual Information, ed. Richard Jung, 583–94. New York: Springer-Verlag
    Broad, C. D. 1925. The Mind and Its Place in Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
    Brooks, D. H. M. 1994. “How to Perform a Reduction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 803–14
    Burge, Tyler. 1993. “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice.” In Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele, 97–120. New York: Oxford University Press
    Byrne, Alex. 1999. “Cosmic Hermeneutics.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 13, Epistemology, ed. James E. Tomberlin, 347–83. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
    Causey, Robert L. 1969. “Polanyi on Structure and Reduction.” Synthèse 20: 230–37
    Chalmers, David. 1996a. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press
    Chalmers, David 1996b. “Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?” Synthèse 108: 309–33
    Chandrasekhar, B. S. 1998. Why Things Are the Way They Are. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Charles, David. 1992. “Supervenience, Composition, and Physicalism.” In Charles and Lennon 1992: 265–96
    Charles, David, and Kathleen Lennon, eds. 1992. Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press
    Child, William. 1997. “Crane on Mental Causation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 97–102
    Chomsky, Noam. 1972. Language and Mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
    Churchland, Patricia. 1981a. “On the Alleged Backwards Referral of Experiences and Its Relevance to the Mind-Body Problem.” Philosophy of Science 48: 165–81
    Churchland, Patricia 1981b. “The Timing of Sensations: Reply to Libet.” Philosophy of Science 48: 492–97
    Churchland, Paul. 1981. “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.” Journal of Philosophy 78: 67–90
    Churchland, Paul 1988. Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Churchland, Paul 1989. A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Copeland, B. Jack. 1996. “What Is Computation?” Synthèse 108: 335–59
    Crane, Tim. 1991. “Why Indeed? Papineau on Supervenience.” Analysis 51: 32–7
    Crane, Tim 1995. “The Mental Causation Debate.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 69: 211–36
    Crane, Tim 1997. “Reply to Child.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 103–8
    Crane, Tim, and D. H. Mellor. 1990. “There Is No Question of Physicalism.” Mind 90: 185–206
    Crick, Francis. 1994. The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul. New York: Maxwell Macmillan International
    Crook, Seth, and Carl Gillett. 2001. “Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31: 333–60
    Daly, Chris. 1995. “Does Physicalism Need Fixing?” Analysis 55.3: 135–41
    Daly, Chris 1997. “Pluralist Metaphysics.” Philosophical Studies 87: 185–206
    Daly, Chris 1998. “What Are Physical Properties?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 196–217
    Davidson, Donald. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University Press
    Dennett, Daniel. 1987. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Dennett, Daniel 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown
    Descartes, René. 1985. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. 1. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Dobelle, W. H., and M. G. Mladejovsky. 1974. “Phosphenes Produced by Electrical Stimulation of Human Occipital Cortex, and Their Application to the Development of a Prosthesis for the Blind.” Journal of Physiology 243: 553–76
    Dretske, Fred. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Dupré, John. 1993. The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
    Eccles, John C. 1994. How the Self Controls Its Brain. New York: Springer-Verlag
    Endicott, Ronald. 1998. “Collapse of the New Wave.” Journal of Philosophy 95: 53–72
    Fales, Evan. 1996. “Plantinga's Case against Naturalistic Epistemology.” Philosophy of Science 63: 432–51
    Field, Hartry. 1975. “Conventionalism and Instrumentalism in Semantics.” Nous 9: 375–405
    Field, Hartry 1986. “The Deflationary Conception of Truth.” In Macdonald and Wright 1986: 55–117
    Field, Hartry 1992. “Physicalism.” In Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science, ed. John Earman, 271–91. Berkeley: University of California Press
    Fitelson, Branden, and Elliott Sober. 1998. “Plantinga's Probability Arguments against Evolutionary Naturalism.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 115–29
    Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. “Special Sciences, or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” Synthèse 28: 97–115
    Fodor, Jerry A 1986. Psychosemantics : The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Fodor, Jerry A 1990. A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Fodor, Jerry A 1997. “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 11, Mind, Causation, and World, ed. James E. Tomberlin, 149–63. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
    Fodor, Jerry, and Zenon Pylyshyn. 1988. “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis.” Cognition 28: 3–71
    Forrest, Peter. 1988. “Supervenience: The Grand-Property Hypothesis.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66: 1–12
    Foster, John. 1991. The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind. New York: Routledge
    Futuyma, Douglas J. 1995. Science on Trial: The Case for Evolution. Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer Associates
    Gell-Mann, Murray. 1994. The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex. New York: W. H. Freeman
    Gillett, Carl, and Barry Loewer. 2001. Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Gillett, Grant. 1993. “Actions, Causes, and Mental Ascriptions.” In Robinson 1993a: 81–100
    Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 1994. “A Modern History Theory of Functions.” Nous 28: 344–62
    Goldman, Alvin I. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
    Goodman, Nelson. 1978. Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett
    Goodsell, David S. 1998. The Machinery of Life. New York: Copernicus, Springer-Verlag
    Gould, Stephen J. 1980. The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History. New York: Norton
    Guinier, André, and Rémi Jullien. 1989. The Solid State: From Superconductors to Superalloys. New York: Oxford University Press
    Hamblin, W. Kenneth. 1992. Earth's Dynamic Systems. 6th ed. New York: Macmillan
    Hansel, C. E. M. 1989. The Search for Psychic Power: ESP and Parapsychology Revisited. Buffalo, N.J.: Prometheus Books
    Hardin, Clyde L. 1987. “Qualia and Materialism: Closing the Explanatory Gap.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48: 281–98
    Harwit, Martin. 1998. Astrophysical Concepts. 3d ed. New York: Springer-Verlag
    Haugeland, John. 1982. “Weak Supervenience.” American Philosophical Quarterly 19: 93–103
    Hellman, Geoffrey. 1985. “Determination and Logical Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 82: 607–16
    Hellman, Geoffrey, and Frank Thompson. 1975. “Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction.” Journal of Philosophy 72: 551–64
    Hempel, Carl G. 1969. “Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets.” In Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White, 179–99. New York: St. Martin's
    Hempel, Carl G 1980. “Comments on Goodman's Ways of Worldmaking.” Synthèse 45: 193–9
    Henderson, David K. 1994. “Accounting for Macro-Level Causation.” Synthèse 101: 129–56
    Henderson, Richard. 1998. “Macromolecular Structure and Self-Assembly.” In Bock and Goode 1998: 36–52
    Hill, Christopher S. 1991. Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Horgan, Terry. 1987. “Supervenient Qualia.” Philosophical Review 96: 491–520
    Horgan, Terry 1989. “Mental Quausation.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, ed. James E. Tomberlin, 47–76. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview
    Horgan, Terry 1991. “Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content.” In Dretske and His Critics, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin, 73–101. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
    Horgan, Terry 1993. “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.” Mind 102: 555–86
    Horgan, Terry, and James Woodward. 1985. “Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay.” Philosophical Review 94: 197–226
    Hume, David. 1975. Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals. 3d ed. New York: Clarendon Press
    Humphrey, Nicholas. 1996. Leaps of Faith: Science, Miracles, and the Search for Supernatural Consolation. New York: Basic Books
    Humphreys, Paul. 1996. “Aspects of Emergence.” Philosophical Topics 24: 53–70
    Humphreys, Paul 1997a. “How Properties Emerge.” Philosophy of Science 64: 1–17
    Humphreys, Paul 1997b. “Emergence, Not Supervenience.” In PSA 1996, Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II, Symposia Papers, ed. Lindley Darden, S337–S345. Supplement to Philosophy of Science 64.4
    Hyman, Ray. 1989. The Elusive Quarry: A Scientific Appraisal of Psychical Research. Buffalo, N.J.: Prometheus Books
    Jack, Andrew. 1994. “Materialism and Supervenience.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 426–44
    Jackson, Frank. 1982. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–36
    Jackson, Frank 1998a. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press
    Jackson, Frank 1998b. “Reference and Description Revisited.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 12, Language, Mind, and Ontology, ed. James E. Tomberlin, 201–18. Cambridge: Blackwell
    Johnson-Laird, Philip. 1983. Mental Models. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
    Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky. 1982. Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Kaplan, Mark. 1996. Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Kazez, Jean. 1995. “Can Counterfactuals Save Mental Causation?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 71–90
    Kim, Jaegwon. 1993. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Kim, Jaegwon 1998. Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Kincaid, Harold. 1997. Individualism and the Unity of Science: Essays on Explanation, Reduction, and the Special Sciences. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield
    Kirk, Robert. 1996a. “How Physicalists Can Avoid Reduction.” Synthèse 108: 157–70
    Kirk, Robert 1996b. “Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 244–57
    Kitcher, Philip. 1984. “1953 and All That. A Tale of Two Sciences.” Philosophical Review 93: 335–73
    Kitcher, Philip 1993. The Advancement of Science. New York: Oxford University Press
    Klagge, James C. 1995. “Supervenience: Model Theory or Metaphysics?” In Savellos and Yalçin 1995: 60–72
    Kornblith, Hilary. 1993. Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell
    Kvanvig, Jonathan L., ed. 1996. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield
    Langton, Christopher G. 1996. “Artificial Life.” In Boden 1996: 39–94
    Lassen, Niels A., David H. Ingvar, and Erik Skinh⊘j. 1978. “Brain Function and Blood Flow.” Scientific American 239: 62–71
    Laudan, Larry. 1996. Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press
    LePore, Ernest, and Barry Loewer. 1987. “Mind Matters.” Journal of Philosophy 84: 630–42
    LePore, Ernest, and Barry Loewer 1989. “More on Making Mind Matter.” Philosophical Topics 17: 175–91
    Levin, Michael E. 1979. “On Theory-Change and Meaning-Change.” Philosophy of Science 46: 407–24
    Levin, Michael E. 1987. “Rigid Designators: Two Applications.” Philosophy of Science 54: 283–94
    Levin, Michael E. 1997a. “Plantinga on Functions and the Theory of Evolution.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 83–98
    Levin, Michael E. 1997b. Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers
    Lewis, David. 1983a. “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343–77
    Lewis, David 1983b. Philosophical Papers: Volume I. New York: Oxford University Press
    Lewis, David 1986. Philosophical Papers: Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press
    Lewis, David 1993. “Many, but Almost One.” In Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong, ed. John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Lloyd Reinhardt, 23–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Libet, Benjamin. 1973. “Electrical Stimulation of Cortex in Human Subjects, and Conscious Memory Aspects.” In Handbook of Sensory Physiology, vol. 2, ed. A. Iggo, 743–90. New York: Springer-Verlag
    Libet, Benjamin 1978. “Neuronal vs. Subjective Timing, for a Conscious Sensory Experience.” In Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience, ed. P. Buser and A. Rougeul-Buser, 69–82. Amsterdam: Elsevier
    Libet, Benjamin 1981. “The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a Sensory Experience Backwards in Time: Reply to P. S. Churchland.” Philosophy of Science 48: 182–97
    Lipton, Peter. 1996. “Is the Best Good Enough?” In The Philosophy of Science, ed. David Papineau, 93–106. New York: Oxford University Press
    Loar, Brian. 1992. “Elimination versus Non-Reductive Physicalism.” In Charles and Lennon 1992: 239–63
    Lockwood, Michael. 1993. “The Grain Problem.” In Robinson 1993a: 271–91
    Lowrie, William. 1997. Fundamentals of Geophysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Lutgens, Frederick K., and Edward J. Tarbuck. 2001. The Atmosphere: An Introduction to Meteorology. 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
    Lycan, William G. 1987. Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Lycan, William G 1988. Judgement and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Lycan, William G 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Macdonald, Cynthia. 1989. Mind-Body Identity Theories. New York: Routledge
    Macdonald, Graham, and Crispin Wright, eds. 1986. Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
    Mackie, John L. 1965. “Causes and Conditions.” American Philosophical Quarterly 2: 245–64
    Madell, Geoffrey. 1988. Mind and Materialism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
    Maher, Patrick. 1993. Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Martin, Michael. 1990. Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Philadelphia: Temple University Press
    May, Robert. 1998. “Levels of Organization in Ecological Systems.” In Bock and Goode 1998: 193–8
    McLaughlin, Brian P. 1989. “Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical.” In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, ed. James E. Tomberlin, 109–35. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview
    McLaughlin, Brian P 1995. “Varieties of Supervenience.” In Savellos and Yalçin 1995: 16–59
    Melnyk, Andrew. 1991. “Physicalism: From Supervenience to Elimination.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51: 573–87
    Melnyk, Andrew 1994. “Being a Physicalist: How and (More Importantly) Why.” Philosophical Studies 74: 221–41
    Melnyk, Andrew 1995a. “Physicalism, Ordinary Objects, and Identity.” Journal of Philosophical Research 20: 221–35
    Melnyk, Andrew 1995b. “Two Cheers for Reductionism; or, The Dim Prospects for Non-Reductive Materialism.” Philosophy of Science 62: 370–88
    Melnyk, Andrew 1996a. “Formulating Physicalism: Two Suggestions.” Synthèse 105: 381–407
    Melnyk, Andrew 1996b. “Searle's Abstract Argument against Strong AI.” Synthèse 108: 391–419
    Melnyk, Andrew 1997a. “On the Metaphysical Utility of Claims of Global Supervenience.” Philosophical Studies 87: 277–308
    Melnyk, Andrew 1997b. “How to Keep the ‘Physical’ in Physicalism.” Journal of Philosophy 94: 622–37
    Melnyk, Andrew 1998. “The Prospects for Kirk's Non-Reductive Physicalism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 323–32
    Melnyk, Andrew 2001. “Physicalism Unfalsified: Chalmers' Inconclusive Conceivability Argument.” In Gillett and Loewer 2001: 329–47
    Merricks, Trenton. 1998. “Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience.” Mind 107: 59–71
    Millikan, Ruth G. 1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Millikan, Ruth G 1993. White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Mills, Eugene. 1996. “Interactionism and Overdetermination.” American Philosophical Quarterly 33: 105–17
    Montero, Barbara. 1999. “The Body Problem.” Nous 33: 183–200
    Mortensen, Chris. 1980. “Neurophysiology and Experiences.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58: 250–64
    Moser, Paul K. 1996. “Physicalism and Mental Causes: Contra Papineau.” Analysis 56: 263–7
    Nagel, Ernest. 1979. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett
    Nagel, Thomas. 1971. “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness.” Synthèse 22: 396–413
    Noble, Dennis. 1998. “Reduction and Integration in Understanding the Heart.” In Bock and Goode 1998: 56–68
    Nurse, Paul. 1998. “Reductionism and Explanation in Cell Biology.” In Bock and Goode 1998: 93–101
    Oppenheim, Paul, and Hilary Putnam. 1958. “Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 2, ed. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell, 3–36. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
    Papineau, David. 1986. “Laws and Accidents.” In Macdonald and Wright 1986: 189–218
    Papineau, David 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
    Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press
    Parfit, Derek 1997. “Reasons and Motivation.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 71: 99–130
    Peacocke, Christopher. 1979. Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press
    Pennock, Robert T. 1999. Tower of Babel: The Evidence against the New Creationism. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press
    Phelps, Michael E., and John C. Mazziotta. 1985. “Positron Emission Tomography: Human Brain Function and Biochemistry.” Science 228: 799–809
    Pinker, Steven. 1997. How the Mind Works. New York: Norton
    Pinker, Steven 1999. Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language. New York: Basic Books
    Plantinga, Alvin. 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. New York: Oxford University Press
    Poland, Jeffrey. 1994. Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations. New York: Oxford University Press
    Popper, Karl R. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. New York: Oxford University Press
    Popper, Karl R., and John C. Eccles. 1977. The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. New York: Springer-Verlag
    Post, John F. 1987. The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics. Ithaca, N.J.: Cornell University Press
    Putnam, Hilary. 1975. Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Putnam, Hilary 1987. The Many Faces of Realism. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court
    Pylyshyn, Zenon. 1984. Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Ravenscroft, Ian. 1997. “Physical Properties.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 35: 419–31
    Rea, Michael C. 1998. “In Defense of Mereological Essentialism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 347–60
    Rensberger, Boyce. 1996. Life Itself: Exploring the Realm of the Living Cell. New York: Oxford University Press
    Robb, David. 1997. “The Properties of Mental Causation.” Philosophical Quarterly 47: 178–94
    Robinson, Howard, ed. 1993a. Objections to Physicalism. New York: Oxford University Press
    Robinson, Howard 1993b. “The Anti-Materialist Strategy and the ‘Knowledge Argument.’” In Robinson 1993a: 159–83
    Roland, P. E. 1981. “Somatotopical Tuning of Postcentral Gyrus during Focal Attention in Man: A Regional Cerebral Blood Flow Study.” Journal of Neurophysiology 46: 744–54
    Roland, P. E., and L. Friberg. 1985. “Localization of Cortical Areas Activated by Thinking.” Journal of Neurophysiology 53: 1219–43
    Roland, P. E., B. Larsen, N. A. Lassen, and E. Skinh⊘j. 1980. “Supplementary Motor Area and Other Cortical Areas in Organization of Voluntary Movements in Man.” Journal of Neurophysiology 43: 118–36
    Rose, Steven. 1998. “What Is Wrong with Reductionist Explanations of Behaviour?” In Bock and Goode 1998: 176–86
    Ross, Michael H., Lynn J. Romrell, and Gordon I. Kaye. 1995. Histology: A Text and Atlas. 3d ed. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins
    Ruben, David-Hillel. 1994. “A Counterfactual Theory of Causal Explanation.” Nous 28: 465–81
    Ryle, Gilbert. 1954. Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Salmon, Wesley C. 1990. Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
    Savellos, Elias E., and Ümit D. Yalçin, eds. 1995. Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Schiffer, Stephen. 1987. Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Segal, Gabriel, and Elliott Sober. 1991. “The Causal Efficacy of Content.” Philosophical Studies 63: 1–30
    Sellars, Wilfrid. 1963. Science, Perception, and Reality. New York: Humanities Press
    Shaffner, Kenneth. 1967. “Approaches to Reduction.” Philosophy of Science 34: 137–57
    Shepherd, Gordon M. 1994. Neurobiology. New York: Oxford University Press
    Shoemaker, Sydney. 1984. Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Sidelle, Alan. 1989. Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Ithaca, N.J.: Cornell University Press
    Sklar, Larry. 1979. “Do Unborn Hypotheses Have Rights?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62: 17–29
    Smart, J. J. C. 1959. “Sensations and Brain Processes.” Philosophical Review 68: 141–56
    Smart, J. J. C. 1978. “The Content of Physicalism.” Philosophical Quarterly 28: 339–41
    Smith, A. D. 1993. “Non-Reductive Physicalism?” In Robinson 1993a: 225–50
    Smith, Peter. 1992. “Modest Reductions and the Unity of Science.” In Charles and Lennon 1992: 19–43
    Snowdon, Paul F. 1989. “On Formulating Materialism and Dualism.” In Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin, ed. John Heil, 137–58. Dordrecht: Kluwer
    Sober, Elliott. 1994. From a Biological Point of View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
    Sober, Elliott 1996. “Parsimony and Predictive Equivalence.” Erkenntnis 44: 167–97
    Staple, Julie, and Stefan Catsicas. 1997. “Molecular Biology of Neurotransmitter Release.” In Molecular Biology of the Neuron, ed. R. Wayne Davies and Brian J. Morris, 123–43. Herndon, Va.: BIOS Scientific Publishers
    Stich, Stephen P., and Ted A. Warfield, eds. 1994. Mental Representation: A Reader. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell
    Sturgeon, Scott. 1988. “Physicalism and Overdetermination.” Mind 107: 411–32
    Swinburne, Richard. 1979. The Existence of God. New York: Oxford University Press
    Swinburne, Richard 1987. “The Structure of the Soul.” In Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry, ed. A. R. Peacocke and G. Gillett, 33–55. New York: Blackwell
    Swinburne, Richard 1996. Is There a God? New York: Oxford University Press
    Swinburne, Richard 2001. Epistemic Justification. New York: Oxford University Press
    Teller, Paul. 1986. “Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37: 71–81
    Thagard, Paul. 1988. Computational Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Thomson, Judith J. 1998. “The Statue and the Clay.” Nous 32.2: 149–73
    Tye, Michael. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
    Tye, Michael 1999. “Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion.” Mind 108: 705–25
    Unger, Peter. 1980. “The Problem of the Many.” In Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5, Studies in Epistemology, ed. Peter French, Theodore Uehling Jr., and Howard Wettstein, 411–68. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
    Van Fraassen, Bas C. 1996. “Science, Materialism, and False Consciousness.” In Kvanvig 1996: 149–81
    Van Gulick, Robert. 1993. “Who's in Charge Here? And Who's Doing All the Work?” In Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele, 233–56. New York: Oxford University Press
    Van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca, N.J.: Cornell University Press
    Vander, Arthur J., James, H. Sherman, and Dorothy S. Luciano. 1990. Human Physiology: The Mechanisms of Body Function. 5th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill
    Walker, Ralph. 1993. “Transcendental Arguments against Physicalism.” In Robinson 1993a: 61–80
    Walton, Alan J. 1983. Three Phases of Matter. 2d ed. New York: Oxford University Press
    Waters, C. Kenneth. 1990. “Why the Anti-Reductionist Consensus Won't Survive: The Case of Classical Mendelian Genetics.” In PSA 1990, ed. A. Fine, M. Forbes, and L. Wessels. East Lansing, Mich.: Philosophy of Science Association
    Weinberg, Steven. 1994. Dreams of a Final Theory: The Scientist's Search for the Ultimate Laws of Nature. New York: Vintage Books
    Wiggins, David. 1980. Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell
    Williams, R. J. P. 1998. “Reductionism in Physical Sciences.” In Bock and Goode 1998: 15–24
    Wilson, Jessica. 1999. “How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?” Philosophical Quarterly 49:33–52
    Witmer, D. Gene. 2000. “Locating the Overdetermination Problem.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51:273–86
    Worley, Sara. 1993. “Mental Causation and Explanatory Exclusion.” Erkenntnis 39:335–58
    Wright, Larry. 1973. “Functions.” Philosophical Review 82: 139–68
    Yablo, Stephen. 1992. “Mental Causation.” Philosophical Review 101: 245–80
    Zangwill, Nick. 1993. “Supervenience and Anomalous Monism: Blackburn on Davidson.” Philosophical Studies 71: 59–79
    Zangwill, Nick 1997. “Explaining Supervenience: Moral and Mental.” Journal of Philosophical Research 22: 509–18