By David Howie
Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print Publication Year:2002
Online Publication Date:July 2009
Online ISBN:9780511498480
Hardback ISBN:9780521812511
Paperback ISBN:9780521037549
Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498480
Subjects: Philosophy of science , Discrete Mathematics, Information Theory and Coding
This book is a study of the concept of probability as it has been used and applied across a number of scientific disciplines from genetics to geophysics. Probability has a dual aspect: sometimes it is a numerical ratio; sometimes, in the Bayesian interpretation, a degree of belief. David Howie examines probabilistic theories of scientific knowledge, and asks how, despite being adopted by many scientists and statisticians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bayesianism was discredited as a theory of scientific inference during the 1920s and 1930s. Through a close examination of a dispute between two British scientists, the author argues that a choice between the two interpretations of probability is not forced by pure logic, or the mathematics of the situation, but depends on the experiences and aims of the individuals involved, and their views of the correct form of scientific inquiry.
Reviews:
pp. i-vi
pp. vii-x
pp. xi-xii
pp. 1-13
2 - Probability up to the Twentieth Century: Read PDF
pp. 14-51
3 - R.A. Fisher and Statistical Probability: Read PDF
pp. 52-80
4 - Harold Jeffreys and Inverse Probability: Read PDF
pp. 81-127
5 - The Fisherâ€“Jeffreys Exchange, 1932â€“1934: Read PDF
pp. 128-170
6 - Probability During the 1930s: Read PDF
pp. 171-221
7 - Epilogue and Conclusions: Read PDF
pp. 222-230
Appendix 1 - Sources for Chapter 2: Read PDF
pp. 231-234
Appendix 2 - Bayesian Conditioning as a Model of Scientific Inference: Read PDF
pp. 235-236
Appendix 3 - Abbreviations Used in the Footnotes: Read PDF
pp. 237-238
pp. 239-252
pp. 253-262
Reference Type: bibliography