Neurophilosophy at Work


Neurophilosophy at Work

In this collection of essays, Paul Churchland explores the unfolding impact of the several empirical sciences of the mind, especially cognitive neurobiology and computational neuroscience on a variety of traditional issues central to the discipline of philosophy. Representing Churchland's most recent research, they continue his research program, launched over thirty years ago, and which has evolved into the field of neurophilosophy.


 Reviews:

"I recommend this book to those beginning their work in the philosophy of mind, or to those who, though experienced philosophers of mind, are ready to revisit Churchland's neurophilosophy." --Andrew Fenton, Dalhousie University: Philosophy in Review

Reference Type: bibliography

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