Democracy Defended

Democracy Defended

Is there a public good? A prevalent view in political science is that democracy is unavoidably chaotic, arbitrary, meaningless, and impossible. Such scepticism began with Condorcet in the eighteenth century, and continued most notably with Arrow and Riker in the twentieth century. In this powerful book, Gerry Mackie confronts and subdues these long-standing doubts about democratic governance. Problems of cycling, agenda control, strategic voting, and dimensional manipulation are not sufficiently harmful, frequent, or irremediable, he argues, to be of normative concern. Mackie also examines every serious empirical illustration of cycling and instability, including Rikers famous argument that the US Civil War was due to arbitrary dimensional manipulation. Almost every empirical claim is erroneous, and none is normatively troubling, Mackie says. This spirited defence of democratic institutions should prove both provocative and influential.


"...path-breaking, thorough, and innovative...It will be 'must reading' for all who wish to understand democracy given the work in the social field over the last 50 years." Social Justice Research, Joe Oppenheimer

"This brilliant counterrevolutionary book makes a frontal attack on the widely accepted claim that Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem for social choice shows democracy to be impossible, arbitrary, and meaningless. In delightfully direct and jargon-free language, Mackie demolishes the theoretical and empirical bases for this claim, notably in the strong version defended by William Riker and his students. His careful and exhaustive re-examination of all the instances on which Riker based his arguments is particularly valuable. At the same time, he puts up a strong defense--two cheers at least--for the institutions of representative democracy. After this vigorous and rigorous attack, social choice theory will never be the same again." Jon Elster, Columbia University

"This is a true tour de force. Gerry Mackie has looked at many of William Riker's best known stories about great manipulations in American history. In almost every case, Riker's story does not hold up--but Mackie's story is as interesting as Riker's. This book is a must read for everyone interested in analytical narratives and political theory." Iain McLean, University of Oxford

"Democracy Defended, by Gerry Mackie, is the latest shooting star in the political science galaxy... [T]he book contains many terrific points, as important to lawyers who think about appellate decisions, legislative intent, and voting law as to the book's intended audience." Saul Levmore, Dean, University of Chicago Law School, for University of Chicago Law Review

"Mackie does an awfully nice job explaining and exploring Arrow's work....Mackie's chapter (six) on [Arrow's independence] condition, standing alone, is more than worth the price of this hefty volume. As careful as he is with Arrow's formal theory, though, Mackie's passionate interest -- and original contribution -- lies in shredding the extensions and empirical applications offered by the late William Riker and his followers at Rochester....Mackie's response [to Riker's most famous example of cycling] is so devastating, so mortifying, that I stopped breathing when I read it....Mackie is beyond tenacious, he is the Inspector Javert of polemics, in ruthlessly tracking down and demolishing every single purported instance of cycling Riker offered, as well as other instances floating around in the literature. His reexamination of the historical record in these cases is original and profound....Not many heretical tracts are as fun as this one, either." Don Herzog, University of Michigan Law School, for University of Chicago Law Review

'Democracy Defended, by Gerry Mackie, is the latest shooting star in the political science galaxy … the book contains may terrific points, as important to lawyers who think about appellate decisions, legislative intent, and voting law as to the book's intended audience.' Saul Levmore, University of Chicago Law School

'Mackie's volume is a path-breaking, thorough, and innovative overview of the subject of social choice and its implications for understanding democracy. It is made up of various lines of analysis including historical interpretation, a review of massive numbers of statistical studies and a careful analysis of numerous aspects of the proof of Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. It will be 'must reading' for all who wish to understand democracy given the work in the social choice field over the last 50 years.' Social Justice Research


Gladys Kammerer Award 2003 - Winner
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. XIII. 1957. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly News Features
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. XXVI. 1970. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly News Features
Albertoni, Ettore A. 1987. Mosca and the Theory of Elitism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Allard, Crispin. 1995. “Lack of Monotonicity – Revisited.” Representation 33: 48–50
Alt, James. 1983. “The Evolution of Tax Structures.” Public Choice 41: 181–223
Amadae, S. M., and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1999. “The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 269–295
Anderson, Thornton. 1993. Creating the Constitution: The Convention of 1787 and the First Congress. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1952. “The Principle of Rationality in Collective Decisions.” In Arrow (1984, 45–58)
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1960. “Introductory Notes.” Portfolio and Art News Annual 4: 76–78
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963/1951. Social Choice and Individual Values, second edn. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1967. “Values and Collective Decision-Making.” In Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, third series. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in Arrow (1984)
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1973. “Formal Theories of Social Welfare.” In Arrow (1984, 115–132)
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1984. Social Choice and Justice: Collected Papers of Kenneth J. Arrow. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1987. “Oral History I: An Interview.” In Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, ed. George R. Feiwel. New York: New York University Press
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1997. “The Functions of Social Choice Theory.” In Kenneth J. Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Kotaro Suzumura, eds., Social Choice Reexamined, vol. I. New York: St. Martin's Press
Ashworth, John. 1995. Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic, vol. I, Commerce and Compromise: 1820–1850. Cambridge University Press
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1998. “Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 1: 259–287
Austen-Smith, David. 1987. “Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over Endogenous Agendas.” American Political Science Review 81: 1323–1329
Baddeley, Alan. 1994. “The Magical Number Seven: Still Magic After All These Years?” Psychological Review 101: 353–356
Barber, William J. 1995. “Chile con Chicago: A Review Essay.” Journal of Economic Literature 33: 1941–1949
Barker, Ernest. 1951. Principles of Social and Political Theory. London: Oxford University Press
Barnard, William D. 1974. Dixiecrats and Democrats: Alabama Politics, 1942–1950. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press
Baron, David P., and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83: 1181–1206
Barry, Brian, and Russell Hardin. 1982. Rational Man and Irrational Society. Beverley Hills: Sage Publications
Bartholdi, John J., III, and James B. Orlin. 1991. “Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting.” Social Choice and Welfare 8: 341–354
Bartholdi, John J., III, Craig A. Tovey, and Michael A. Trick. 1989. “Voting Schemes for which It Can Be Difficult to Tell Who Won the Election.” Social Choice and Welfare 6: 157–165
Bartholdi, John J., III, Craig A. Tovey, and Michael A. Trick. 1992a. “The Computational Difficulty of Manipulating an Election.” Social Choice and Welfare 6: 227–241
Bartholdi, John J., III, Craig A. Tovey, and Michael A. Trick. 1992b. “How Hard Is It to Control an Election?” Mathematical and Computer Modelling 16: 27–40
Beer, Samuel H. 1960. “New Structures of Democracy: Britain and America.” In Samuel H. Beer, Leon D. Epstein, Louis Hartz, Charles E. Lindblom, and J. Roland Pennock, eds., Democracy in the Mid-Twentieth Century. St. Louis: Washington University Press
Bell, Daniel. 1974. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. London: Heinemann
Berg, Sven. 1985. “Paradox of Voting under an Urn Model: The Effect of Homogeneity.” Public Choice 47: 377–387
Bernholz, Peter. 1975. “Logrolling and the Paradox of Voting: Are They Logically Equivalent?” American Political Science Review 69: 961–962
Bjurulf, Bo, and Richard Niemi. 1978. “Strategic Voting in Scandinavian Parliaments.” Scandinavian Political Studies 1(n.s.): 5–22
Black, Duncan. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge University Press
Block, Cheryl D. 1998. “Truth and Probability – Ironies in the Evolution of Social Choice Theory.” Washington University Law Quarterly 76: 975–1036
Blydenburgh, John C. 1971. “The Closed Rule and the Paradox of Voting.” Journal of Politics 33: 57–71
Bohman, James. 1996. Public Deliberation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Bordes, Georges, and Nicolaus Tideman. 1991. “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the Theory of Voting.” Theory and Decision 30: 163–186
Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. 2000. “Walrasian Economics in Retrospect.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 1411–1439
Bradley, Patrick. 1995, “STV and Monotonicity: A Hands-On Assessment.” Representation 33: 46–47
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Alan Hamlin. 2000. Democratic Devices and Desires. Cambridge University Press
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Loren Lomasky. 1993. Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. Cambridge University Press
Bucolo, Placido, ed. 1980. The Other Pareto. London: Scolar Press
Budge, Ian. 1993. “Issues, Dimensions, and Agenda Change in Postwar Democracies: Longterm Trends in Party Election Programs and Newspaper Reports in Twenty-Three Democracies.” In William H. Riker, ed., Agenda Formation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Burnham, James. 1943. The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom. London: Putnam
Burnham, W. Dean. 1955. Presidential Ballots: 1836–1892. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Burnham, W. Dean. 1999. “Constitutional Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A Political Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackerman's We the People.” Yale Law Journal 108: 2237–2277
Byrd, Robert C. 1988. The Senate, vol. I. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office
Cain, Michael J. G. 2001. In William F. Shughart III and Laura Razzolini, eds., The Elgar Companion to Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Calvert, Randall L., and Richard F. Fenno, Jr. 1994. “Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate.” The Journal of Politics 56: 349–376
Caplan, Russell L. 1988. Constitutional Brinksmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention. New York: Oxford University Press
Caplin, Andrew, and Barry Nalebuff. 1988. “On 64% Majority Rule.” Econometrica 56 (July): 787–814
Caplin, Andrew, and Barry Nalebuff. 1991. “Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem.” Econometrica 59: 1–23
Chamberlin, John R. 1985. “Investigation into the Relative Manipulability of Four Voting Systems.” Behavioral Science 30: 195–203
Chamberlin, John R., Jerry L. Cohen, and Clyde H. Coombs. 1984. “Social Choice Observed: Five Presidential Elections of the American Psychological Association.” Journal of Politics 46: 479–502
Citrin, Jack and Donald Philip Green. 1990. “The Self-Interest Motive in American Public Opinion.” In Samuel Long, ed., Research in Micropolitics, vol. III. Greenwich: JAI Press
Coady, C. A. J. 1992. Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Cohen, Joshua. 1986. “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy.” Ethics 97 (October): 26–38
Cohn, Jonathan. 1999. “Irrational Exuberance: What Did Political Science Forget about Politics?” New Republic, October 25
Coleman, James. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Collie, Mellisa P. 1988. “The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 13: 427–458
Colman, Andrew M., and Ian Pountney. 1978. “Borda's Paradox: Theoretical Likelihood and Electoral Occurrences.” Behavioral Science 23: 15–21
Conlan, Timothy J., Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Beam. 1990. Taxing Choices: The Politics of Tax Reform. Washington: Congressional Quarterly
Cooter, Robert and Peter Rappoport. 1984. “Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?” Journal of Economic Literature 22: 507–530
Cowen, Tyler. 1993. “The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty.” Economics and Philosophy 9: 253–269
Cox, Gary W. 1987. “Electoral Equilibria under Alternative Voting Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science. 31: 82–108
Cox, Gary W. 1990. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science. 34: 903–935
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge University Press
Cox, Gary W. 1999. “The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory: A Reply to Green and Shapiro.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 147–169
Cox, Gary, and Timothy N. Tutt. 1984. “Universalism and Allocative Decision Making in the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.” Journal of Politics 46: 546–555
Dahl, Robert A. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. University of Chicago Press
Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Davidson, Donald. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Davidson, Donald. 1986. “Judging Interpersonal Interests.” In Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge University Press
Davidson, Donald. 1991a. “Epistemology Externalized.” Dialectica 45: 191–202
Davidson, Donald. 1991b. “Three Varieties of Knowledge.” In A. J. Ayer Memorial Essays, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths. Cambridge University Press
Davies, Todd, and Raja Shah. 2003. “Intuitive Preference Aggregation: Tests of Independence and Consistency.” Presented at Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, March 21, Nashville
Denzau, Arthur, William Riker, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1985. “Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style.” American Political Science Review 79: 1117–1134
DeVoto, Bernard. 1957. The Year of Decision, 1846. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode
Divine, Robert A., et al. 1999. America: Past and Present. New York: Longman
Dobra, John L. 1983. “An Approach to Empirical Studies of Voting Paradoxes: An Update and Extension.” Public Choice 41: 241–250
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row
Drew, Elizabeth. 2000. The Corruption of American Politics: What Went Wrong and Why. New York: Overlook Press
Dryzek, John, and Christian List. 2003. “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation.” British Journal of Political Science 33: 1–28
Dryzek, John. 2000. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford University Press
Dummett, Michael. 1997. Principles of Electoral Reform. Oxford University Press
Dummett, Michael. 1998. “The Borda Count and Agenda Manipulation.” Social Choice and Welfare 15: 287–296
Dumond, Dwight Lowell. 1931. The Secession Movement: 1860–1861. New York: Macmillan Company
Eakin, Emily. 2000. “Political Scientists Are in a Revolution Instead of Watching.” The New York Times, November 4
Eckel, Catherine C., and Philip J. Grossman. 1996. “Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 16: 181–189
Elster, Jon, ed. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge University Press
Elster, Jon. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens. Cambridge University Press
Elster, Jon. 1986a. “Introduction.” In Jon Elster, ed., Rational Choice. New York University Press
Elster, Jon. 1986b. “The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory.” In Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge University Press
Enelow, James M. 1997. “Cycling and Majority Rule.” In Dennis C. Mueller, ed., Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge University Press
Farquharson, Robin. 1969. Theory of Voting. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Farrand, Max, ed. 1966. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 4 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press
Farrand, Max. 1913. The Framing of the Constitution of the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press
Farrell, David M. 2001. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Fay, Brian. 1996. Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: A Multicultural Approach. Oxford: Blackwell
Fehr, Ernst, and Urs Fischbacher. 2002. “Why Social Preferences Matter. The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives.” Economic Journal 112: C1–C33
Fehrenbacher, Don E. 1995. Sectional Crisis and Southern Constitutionalism. Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press
Feld, Scott L., and Bernard Grofman. 1986. “Partial Single-Peakedness: An Extension and Clarification.” Public Choice 51: 71–80
Feld, Scott L., and Bernard Grofman. 1992. “Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Cycle? Evidence from 36 Elections.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 4: 231–237
Feldman, Allen M. 1980. Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Feldman, Allen M. 1991. “Welfare Economics.” In John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, eds., The New Palgrave: The World of Economics. New York: W. W. Norton
Felsenthal, Dan S., and Moshe Machover. 1995. “Who Ought to Be Elected and Who Is Elected? An Empirical Investigation of 92 Elections under Three Procedures.” Electoral Studies. 14: 143–169
Felsenthal, Dan S., Zeev Maoz, and Amnon Rapoport. 1993. “An Empirical Evaluation of Six Voting Procedures: Do They Really Make Any Difference?” British Journal of Political Science 23: 1–27
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1966. The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. Boston: Little Brown
Ferejohn, John, Morris P. Fiorina, and Richard D. McKelvey. 1987. “Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Setting.” American Journal of Political Science 31: 169–193
Fine, Benjamin. 1957. “President Pushes School Help Bill.” The New York Times, July 4, sec. 1, p. 15
Finer, Samuel E. 1966. Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings. London: Pall Mall Press
Fiorina, Morris P., and Charles Plott. 1978. “Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study.” American Political Science Review 72: 575–598
Fiorina, Morris P., and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1982. “Equilibrium, Disequilibrium, and the General Possibility of a Science of Politics.” In Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Equilibrium. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff
Fischer, David Hackett. 1989. Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America. Oxford University Press
Fogel, Robert William. 1989. Without Consent or Contract. New York: W. W. Norton
Fogel, Robert William. 1992. “Problems in Modeling Complex Dynamic Interactions: The Political Realignment of the 1850s.” Economics and Politics 4: 215–254
Freehling, William W. 1990. The Road to Disunion, vol. I, Secessionists at Bay: 1776–1854. New York: Oxford University Press
Gallagher, Michael. 1999. “The Results Analysed.” In Michael Gallagher and Michael Laver, eds., How Ireland Voted, 1997. Boulder: Westview Press
Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. 1995. “Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad.” World Politics 47: 534–554
Gehrlein, William V. 1983. “Condorcet's Paradox.” Theory and Decision. 15: 161–197
Gehrlein, William V. 1995. “Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity.” In William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich, and Norman J. Schofield, eds., Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge University Press
Gehrlein, William V. 1997. “Condorcet's Paradox and the Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules.” Mathematica Japonica 45: 173–199
Gibbard, Allan. 1973. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” Econometrica 41: 587–601
Gillroy, John Martin, and Maurice Wade, eds. 1992. The Moral Dimensions of Public Policy Choice. University of Pittsburgh Press
Ginsberg, Allen. 1956. Howl and Other Poems. San Francisco: City Lights Books
Glazer, Amihai, and Henry McMillan. 1982. “Amend the Old or Address the New: Broad-Based Legislation When Proposing Policies is Costly.” Public Choice 74: 43–58
Goodin, Robert, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1996. A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford University Press
Goodin, Robert, and K. W. S. Roberts. 1975. “The Ethical Voter.” American Political Science Review 69: 926–928
Goodin, Robert. 1992. Motivating Political Morality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Goodin, Robert. 1995/1986. “Laundering Preferences.” In Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press
Goodman, Leo, and Harry Markowitz. 1952. “Social Welfare Functions Based on Individual Rankings.” American Journal of Sociology 58: 257–262
Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Griffin, James. 1986. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Grofman, Bernard, and Andrew Reynolds. 2001. “Electoral Systems and the Art of Constitutional Engineering: An Inventory of the Main Findings.” In Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio, eds., Rules and Reason. Cambridge University Press
Grofman, Bernard, and Guillermo Owen. 1986. Information Pooling and Group Decision-Making. London: JAI Press
Grofman, Bernard, and Scott L. Feld. 1988. “Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective.” American Political Science Review 82: 567–576
Grofman, Bernard. 1984. “The General Irrelevance of the Zero Sum Assumption in the Legislative Context.” In M. J. Holler, ed., Coalitions and Collective Action. Würzburg: Physica-Verlag
Groseclose, Tim, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1996. “Buying Supermajorities.” American Political Science Review 90: 303–315
Gross, Donald. 1979. “Conference Committees, Sophisticated Voting, and Cyclical Majorities.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4(1): 79–94
Habermas, Jürgen. 1984, 1987. Theory of Communicative Action, vols. I and II. Boston: Beacon Press
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison. n.d. (1937)/1787. The Federalist: A Comment on the Constitution of the United States. New York: The Modern Library
Hamilton, Charles V. 1991. Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. New York: Atheneum
Hansson, Bengt. 1973. “The Independence Condition in the Theory of Social Choice.” Theory and Decision 4: 25–49
Hardin, Russell. 1976. “Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition.” American Political Science Review 70: 1202–1214
Hardin, Russell. 1993. “Public Choice Versus Democracy.” In David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, eds., The Idea of Democracy. Cambridge University Press
Hauptmann, Emily. 1996. Putting Choice Before Democracy: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory. Albany: SUNY Press
Haynes, George H. 1938. The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Hennessy, Alistair. 1969. “Latin America.” In Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., Populism: Its Meanings and Characteristics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Ginitis, and Richard McElreath. 2001. “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.” American Economic Review 91: 73–78
Hesseltine, William B. 1962. The Tragic Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction. New York: George Braziller
Hill, Steven. 2002. Fixing Elections: The Failure of America's Winner Take All Politics. New York: Routledge
Hinich, Melvin J., and Michael C. Munger. 1994. Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Hinich, Melvin J., and Michael C. Munger. 1997. Analytical Politics. Cambridge University Press
Hoebeke, Christopher Hyde. 1995. The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers
Holmes, Stephen. 1990. “The Secret History of Self-Interest.” In Jane Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest. University of Chicago Press
Holt, James. 1967. Congressional Insurgents and the Party System: 1909–1916. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Hovenkamp, Herbert. 1990a. “Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government.” Iowa Law Review 75: 949–973
Hovenkamp, Herbert. 1990b. “Legislation, Well-Being and Public Choice.” University of Chicago Law Review 57: 63–116
Hume, David. 1975. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd edn., ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Jacobsen, Kurt. 2001. “Unreal, Man.” The Guardian (UK), April 3
Jay, William. 1849. A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War. Boston, MA: Benjamin D. Mussey
Jenkins, Jeffery A., and Irwin Morris. 2002. “Running to Lose? John C. Breckinridge and the Presidential Election of 1860.” Manuscript
Jevons, William Stanley. 1871. Theory of Political Economy. London: Macmillan
Jillson, Calvin C. 1979. “The Executive in Republican Government: The Case of the American Founding.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 9: 386–402
Johannsen, Robert W. 1973. Stephen A. Douglas. Oxford University Press
Jones, Bradford, Benjamin Radcliff, Charles Taber, and Richard Tampone. 1995. “Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations for Weak Preference Orders.” American Political Science Review 89: 137–146
Joslyn, R. A. 1976. “The Impact of Decision Rules in Multi-candidate Campaigns: The Case of the 1972 Democratic Presidential Nomination.” Public Choice 25: 1–17
Kasza, Gregory. 2001. “Perestroika: For an Ecumenical Science of Politics.” PSOnline, September,
Katznelson, Ira and Helen Milner, eds., 2002. Political Science: The State of the Discipline. New York: W. W. Norton
Kavka, Gregory S. 1991. “Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?” Economics and Philosophy 7: 143–165
Kelly, Jerry S. 1988. Social Choice Theory: An Introduction. Berlin: Springer-Verlag
Kinder, Donald R. and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1979. “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 23: 495–527
Kinder, Donald R. and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case.” British Journal of Political Science 11: 129–161
King, Ronald F., and Susan Ellis. 1996. “Partisan Advantage and Constitutional Change: The Case of the Seventeenth Amendment.” Studies in American Political Development 10: 69–102
Koford, Kenneth J. 1982. “Centralized Vote Trading.” Public Choice 39: 245–268
Kramer, Gerald H. 1973. “On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule.” Econometrica 41: 285–297
Kramer, Gerald H. 1977. “A Dynamic Model of Political Equilibrium.” Journal of Economic Theory 16: 310–334
Krehbiel, Keith, and Douglas Rivers. 1990. “Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration.” Journal of Politics 52: 548–578
Kuga, Kiyoshi, and Hiroaki Nagatani. 1974. “Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting.” Econometrica 42 (November): 1045–1067
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter. 2001a. “An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate.” Public Choice 107: 135–145
Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter. 2001b. “Intransitivity and Robustness in Social Choice: Evidence from Danish Election Surveys.” Public Choice Society, Conference, San Antonio Texas, 9–11 March
Kuttner, Robert. 1996. Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets. University of Chicago Press
Kyvig, David E. 1996. Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U. S. Constitution, 1776–1995. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas
Lagerspetz, Eerik. 1993. “Social Choice in the Real World.” Scandinavian Political Studies 16(1): 1–23
Lagerspetz, Eerik. 1997. “Social Choice in the Real World II: Cyclical Preferences and Strategic Voting in the Finnish Presidential Elections.” Scandinavian Political Studies 20(1): 53–67
Laing, J. D., and Benjamin Slotznick. 1987. “Viable Alternatives to the Status Quo.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31: 63–85
Laing, J. D., and Benjamin Slotznick. 1991. “When Anyone Can Veto: A Laboratory Study of Committees Governed by Unanimous Rule.” Behavioral Science 36: 179–195
Laing, J.D, and S. Olmstead. 1978. “An Experimental and Game-Theoretic Study of Committees. In Peter C. Ordeshook, ed., Game Theory and Political Science. New York University Press
Le Breton, Michel, and Michel Truchon. 1997. “A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions.” Mathematical Social Sciences 34: 249–272
Levin, Jonathan, and Barry Nalebuff. 1995. “An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 3–26
Lewin, Leif. 1991. Self-Interest and Public Interest in Western Politics. Oxford University Press
Lewis, Anthony. 1956. “School Aid and Tangled Politics.” The New York Times, July 8, sec. IV, p. 1
Lichbach, Mark I. 1996. The Cooperator's Dilemma. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Lindsay, Alexander Dunlop. 1935. Essentials of Democracy. London: Oxford University Press
Linz, Juan. 1994. “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” In Juan Linz, and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy, vol. I, Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Lippincott, Benjamin Evans. 1938. Victorian Critics of Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
List, Christian and Robert E. Goodin. 2001. “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem.” Journal of Political Philosophy 9: 277–306
List, Christian. 2001. Mission Impossible? The Problem of Democratic Aggregation in the Face of Arrow's Theorem. D.Phil. thesis in politics, Nuffield College, Oxford.
List, Christian. 2002. “Intradimensional Single-Peakedness and the Multidimensional Arrow Problem.” Theory and Practice 52: 287–301
List, Christian. 2003. “Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate?” Erkentniss 58: 229–260
Little, I. M. D. 1952. “Social Choice and Individual Values.” Journal of Political Economy 60: 422–432
Lutz, Donald S., and James R. Williams. 1976. Minimum Winning Coalitions in Legislatures: A Review of the Evidence. Beverley Hills: Sage Publications
Ma, Barry K., and Jeffrey H. Weiss. 1993. “On Some Generalizations of a Mean Voter Theorem.” Economics Letters 42: 185–188
Mackay, Alfred F. 1980. Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Mackie, Gerry. 1996. “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account.” American Sociological Review 61: 99–1017
Mackie, Gerry. 1998. “All Men are Liars. Is Democracy Meaningless?” In Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy Cambridge University Press
Mansbridge, Jane. 1990. Beyond Self-Interest. University of Chicago Press
Mansbridge, Jane. 1994. “Public Spirit in Political Systems.” In Henry J. Aaron, Thomas E. Mann, and Timothy Taylor, eds., Values and Public Policy. Washington: The Brookings Institution
Mashaw, Jerry L. 1989. “The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law.” Chicago-Kent Law Review 65: 123–160
May, Kenneth O. 1952. “A Set of Independent, Necessary, and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision.” Econometrica 20 (October): 680–684
McDonald, Forrest. 1985. Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the U. S. Constitution. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas
McKelvey, Richard D. 1976. “Intransitivities in Multi-dimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472–482
McKelvey, Richard D. 1979. “General Conditions for Global Intransivities in Formal Voting Models.” Econometrica 47: 1084–1111
McKelvey, Richard D. 1986. “Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice.” American Journal of Political Science 24: 68–96
McKelvey, Richard D., and Norman J. Schofield. 1986. “Structural Instability of the Core.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 15: 179–198
McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1990. “A Decade of Experimental Research in Spatial Models of Elections and Committees.” In James M. Enelow, and Melvin J. Hinich, eds., Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge University Press
McLean, Ian, and Arnold B. Urken, eds. 1995. Classics of Social Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
McLean, Ian, and Fiona Hewitt. 1994. Condorcet: Foundations of Political Theory and Social Choice. Aldershot: Edward Elgar
McLean, Ian, Christian List, James Fishkin, and Robert Luskin. 2000. “Can Deliberation Induce Greater Preference Structuration? Evidence from Deliberative Opinion Polls.” Proceedings of the American Political Science Association
McLean, Ian. 1995. “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives before Arrow.” Mathematical Social Sciences 30: 107–126
McPherson, James M. 1993. Ordeal by Fire, vol. I, The Coming of War. New York: McGraw-Hill
Merrill, Samuel, III. 1988. Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic. Princeton University Press
Michaelsen, William B. 1987. Creating the American Presidency: 1775–1789. Lanham, MD: University Press of America
Miller, Arthur H., Charles Tien, and Andrew A. Peebler. 1996. “The American Political Science Review Hall of Fame: Assessments and Implications for an Evolving Discipline.” PS: Political Science and Politics 29 (1): 78
Miller, D. W. 2001. “Storming the Palace of Political Science.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 21
Miller, Dale T., and Rebecca K. Ratner. 1996. “The Power of the Myth of Self-Interest.” In Leo Montada and Melvin J. Lerner, eds., Current Societal Concerns About Justice. New York: Plenum Press
Miller, Dale T., and Rebecca K. Ratner. 1998. “The Disparity between the Actual and the Assumed Power of Self-Interest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74: 53–62
Miller, Gary J. 1997. “The Impact of Economics on Contemporary Political Science.” Journal of Economic Literature 35: 1173–1204
Miller, Gary J., and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 1982. “Universalism in Experimental Committees.” American Political Science Review 76: 561–574
Miller, George A. 1994/1956. “The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information.” Psychological Review 101: 343–352
Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman, and Scott L. Feld. 1989. “The Geometry of Majority Rule.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 4: 379–406
Miller, William Lee. 1997. Arguing about Slavery. New York: Alfred A. Knopf
Moore, Glover. 1967. The Missouri Controversy: 1819–1821. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith
Morison, Elting. 1971. “Election of 1860.” In Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Fred L. Israel, and William P. Hansen, eds., History of American Presidential Elections: 1789–1968, vol. II. New York: Chelsea House
Morris, John D. 1957a. “School Aid Bill Killed in House by 208–203 Vote.” The New York Times, July 26, sec. I, p. 1
Morris, John D. 1957b. “Democrats Blame President for School Aid Bill Defeat.” The New York Times, July 27, sec. I, p. 1
Morrison, Chaplain W. 1967. Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso Controversy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
Moulin, Hervé. 1988. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press
Mueller, Dennis C. 1989. Public Choice II. Cambridge University Press
Mueller, Dennis C. 1996. Constitutional Democracy. Oxford University Press
Murdoch, Iris. 1992. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. London: Penguin
Mutz, Diane, and Jeffery J. Mondak. 1997. “Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group-Based Judgments of Fairness and Well-Being.” American Journal of Political Science 41: 284–308
Myerson, Roger B. 1995. “Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 77–89
Myerson, Roger B., and Robert J. Weber. 1993. “A Theory of Voting Equilibria.” American Political Science Review 87: 102–115
Neufeld, John L., William J. Hausman, and Ronald B. Rapoport. 1994. “A Paradox of Voting: Cyclical Majorities and the Case of Muscle Shoals.” Political Research Quarterly 47: 423–438
Nevins, Allan. 1950. The Emergence of Lincoln, vol. II, Prologue to Civil War: 1859–1861. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons
Niemi, Richard G. 1969. “Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality.” American Political Science Review 63 (June): 488–497
Niemi, Richard G. 1983. “Why So Much Stability?: Another Opinion.” Public Choice 41: 261–270
Niemi, Richard G., and J. R. Wright. 1987. “Voting Cycles and the Structure of Individual Preferences.” Social Choice and Welfare 4: 173–183
Niou, Emerson, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1985. “Universalism in Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 29: 246–258
Nitzan, Shmuel. 1985. “The Vulnerability of Point-Voting Schemes to Preference Variation and Strategic Manipulation.” Public Choice 47: 349–370
Nurmi, Hannu. 1987. Comparing Voting Systems. Dordrecht: D. Reidel
Nurmi, Hannu. 1992. “An Assessment of Voting System Simulations.” Public Choice 73: 459–487
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1982. “Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A Comment on William H. Riker's ‘Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.’” In Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Equilibrium. Boston, MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory. Cambridge University Press
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge University Press
Pareto, Vilfredo. 1963. The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology. New York: Dover
Pellikaan, Huib, and Robert J. van der Veen. 2002 Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design. Cambridge University Press
Pettit, Philip. 1996. “Institutional Design and Rational Choice.” In Robert Goodin, ed., The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Pildes, Richard H., and Elizabeth S. Anderson. 1990. “Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics.” Columbia Law Review 90 (8): 2121–2214
Plamenatz, John. 1973. Democracy and Illusion. London: Longman
Plott, Charles, and Michael Levine. 1978. “A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions.” American Economic Review 68: 146–160
Plott, Charles. 1971. “Recent Results in the Theory of Voting.” In M. Intriligator, ed., Frontiers of Quantitative Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland
Plott, Charles. 1976. “Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation.” American Journal of Political Science 20: 511–596
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1999. “D-NOMINATE After 10 Years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting.” Available at
Poole, Keith T., Howard Rosenthal, and Boris T. Shor. 1999. Voteview for Windows 2.0.0: Roll Call Displays of the U. S. Congress, 1789–1988. Available at
Popkin, Samuel. 1991. The Reasoning Voter. University of Chicago Press
Potter, David M. 1976. The Impending Crisis: 1848–1861. New York: Harper
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University Press
Radcliff, Benjamin. 1993. “The Structure of Voter Preferences.” Journal of Politics 55: 714–719
Radcliff, Benjamin. 1994. “Collective Preferences in Presidential Elections.” Electoral Studies 13: 50–57
Radner, Roy, and Jacob Marschak. 1954. “Note on Some Proposed Decision Criteria.” In R. M. Thrall, C. H. Coombs, and R. L. Davies, eds., Decision Processes. New York: John Wiley
Rae, D. W. 1969. “Decision Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice.” American Political Science Review 63 (March): 40–56
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press
Ray, Paramesh. 1973. “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.” Econometrica 41: 987–993
Redman, Eric. 1973. The Dance of Legislation. New York: Simon and Schuster
Regenwetter, Michel, and Bernard Grofman. 1998. “Approval Voting, Borda Winners, and Condorcet Winners: Evidence from Seven Elections.” Management Science 44: 520–533
Regenwetter, Michel, James Adams, and Bernard Grofman. 2002. “On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An Alternative View of Majority Cycles and Social Homogeneity.” Theory and Decision 53: 153–186
Reilly, Benjamin. 2001. Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management. Cambridge University Press
Reston, James. 1956. “The Race between Politics and Education.” The New York Times, July 8, sec. IV, p. 9
Riker, William H. 1953. Democracy in the United States. New York: Macmillan
Riker, William H. 1958. “The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments.” American Political Science Review 52: 349–366
Riker, William H. 1961. “Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographic Overview of Selected Developments during the Last Decade.” American Political Science Review 55: 900–911
Riker, William H. 1963. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Riker, William H. 1965. “Arrow's Theorem and Some Examples of the Paradox of Voting.” In John M. Claunch, ed., Mathematical Applications in Political Science. Dallas: The Arnold Foundation
Riker, William H. 1980a. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 74: 432–446
Riker, William H. 1980b. “A Reply to Ordeshook and Rae.” In Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Disequilibrium. Boston: Kluwer
Riker, William H. 1982. Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press
Riker, William H. 1984. “The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice.” American Political Science Review 78: 1–16
Riker, William H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Riker, William H. 1990a. “Heresthetic and Rhetoric in the Spatial Model.” In James M. Enelow, and Melvin J. Hinich, eds., Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge University Press
Riker, William H. 1990b. “Political Science and Rational Choice.” In James E. Alt, and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge University Press
Riker, William H. 1993. “Introduction.” In William H. Riker, ed., Agenda Formation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1973. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Riker, William H., and Barry R. Weingast. 1988. “Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures.” Virginia Law Review 74: 373–402
Risse, Mathias. 2001. “Arrow's Theorem, Indeterminacy, and Multiplicity Reconsidered.” Ethics 111: 706–734
Robbins, Lionel. 1937/1932. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2nd edn. London: Macmillan and Co
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1995. “How China Could Have Won: The Nonneutrality of the Olympic Voting Rules.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14(1): 140–142
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1968/1762. The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston. London: Penguin
Rowley, Charles K. 1993. “Introduction.” In Rowley, ed., Social Choice Theory, vol. I. Hants, UK: Cheltenham
Runciman, W. G. 1963. Social Science and Political Theory. Cambridge University Press
Saari, Donald G. 1990. “Susceptibility to Manipulation.” Public Choice 64: 24–41
Saari, Donald G. 1995a. Basic Geometry of Voting. Berlin: Springer
Saari, Donald G. 1995b. “Mathematical Complexity of Simple Economics.” Notices of the AMS 42: 222–231
Saari, Donald G. 1997. “The Generic Existence of a Core for q-Rules.” Economic Theory 9: 219–260
Saari, Donald G. 2000a. “Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes: I. Pairwise Votes.” Economic Theory 15: 1–53
Saari, Donald G. 2000b. “Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes: II Positional Voting.” Economic Theory 15: 55–102
Saari, Donald G. 2001a. Chaotic Elections. American Mathematical Society
Saari, Donald G. 2001b. Decisions and Elections. Cambridge University Press
Saari, Donald G. 2003. “Capturing the ‘Will of the People.’” Ethics: 113: 333–349
Samuelson, Paul. 1977. The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, vol. IV, ed., H. Nagatani and K. Crowley. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Satterthwaite, Mark A. 2001. “Strategy-Proofness and Markets.” Social Choice and Welfare 18: 37–58
Satterthwaite, Mark. 1975. “Strategy Proofness and Arrow's Conditions.” Journal of Economic Theory 10: 187–217
Scarf, Herbert. 1960. “Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium.” International Economic Review 1: 157–172
Schofield, Norman. 1978. “Instability of Simple Dynamic Games.” Review of Economic Studies 45: 575–594
Schofield, Norman. 1982. “Instability and Development in the Political Economy.” In Peter C. Ordeshook and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Political Equilibrium. Boston, MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff
Schofield, Norman. 1995. “Democratic Stability.” In Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., Explaining Social Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Schwartz, Joseph M. 1995. The Permanence of the Political: A Democratic Critique of the Radical Impulse to Transcend Politics. Princeton University Press
Schwartz, Thomas. 1982. “Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum.” Nous 6: 97–117
Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. 1991. “The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes.” In M. P. Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. XXIV, 2–91. New York: Academic Press
Sellers, Charles. 1966. James K. Polk: Continentalist, 1843–1846. Princeton University Press
Sen, Amartya. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day
Sen, Amartya. 1982. Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Sen, Amartya. 1993. “Internal Consistency of Choice.” Econometrica 61 (May): 495–521
Sen, Amartya. 1995. “Rationality and Social Choice.” American Economic Review 85: 1–24
Sen, Amartya. 1999. “The Possibility of Social Choice.” American Economic Review 89: 349–378
Shapin, Steven. 1994. A Social History of Truth. University of Chicago Press
Shaviro, Daniel. 2000. When Rules Change. University of Chicago Press
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. “Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization.” American Journal of Political Science 25: 96–111
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1984. “Political Solutions to Market Problems.” American Political Science Review 78: 417–434
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behaviors, and Institutions. New York: W. W. Norton
Shiffrin, Richard M. and Robert M. Nosofsky. 1994. “Seven Plus or Minus Two: A Commentary on Capacity Limitations.” Psychological Review 101: 357–361
Skaperdas, Stergios. 2002. “Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Governance.” University of California, Irvine, manuscript
Snow, C. P. 1951. The Masters. London: Macmillan
Stampp, Kenneth M., ed. 1974. The Causes of the Civil War. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Stepan, Alfred, and Cindy Skach. 1994. “Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective.” In Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy, vol. I, Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Stigler, George, and Gary Becker. 1977. “De Gustibus non Disputandum.” American Economic Review 67: 76–90
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2000. “The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115: 1441–1478
Stratmann, Thomas. 1997. “Logrolling.” In Dennis C. Mueller, ed., Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge University Press
Strom, Gerald S. 1990. The Logic of Lawmaking: A Spatial Theory Approach. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Sunstein, Cass R. 1988. “Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue.” In Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutions and Democracy. Cambridge University Press
Sunstein, Cass R. 1990. “Preferences and Politics.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20(3): 999
Sunstein, Cass R. 1993. The Partial Constitution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Tabarrok, Alexander, and Lee Spector. 1999. “Would the Borda Count Have Avoided the Civil War?” Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 261–288
Tangian, A. S. 2000. “Unlikelihood of Condorcet's Paradox in a Large Society.” Social Choice and Welfare 17: 337–365
Tanguiane, A. S. 1991. Aggregation and Representation of Preferences: Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy. Berlin: Springer-Verlag
Taylor, Michael J. 1969. “Proof of a Theorem on Majority Rule.” Behavioral Science 14 (May): 228–231
Thagard, Paul. 1992. Conceptual Revolutions. Princeton University Press
Thomas, James D., and William H. Stewart. 1988. Alabama Government and Politics. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1969/1851. Democracy in America, trans. George Lawrence. New York: Doubleday
Tovey, Craig A. 1995. “Dynamical Convergence in the Euclidean Spatial Model.” In William A. Barnett, Herve Moulin, Maurice Salles, Norman J. Schofield, eds., Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics. Cambridge University Press
Tribe, Laurence. 1988. American Constitutional Law, 2nd edn. Mineola, NY: The Foundation Press
Tsetlin, Ilia, Michel Regenwetter, and Bernard Grofman. 2001. “The Impartial Culture Maximizes the Probability of Majority Cycles.” Manuscript
Tuck, Richard. 1993. “The Contribution of History.” In Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds., A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Tullock, Gordon. 1992. “Is There a Paradox of Voting?” Journal of Theoretical Politics 4: 225–230
Tushnet, Mark. 1988. Red, White, and Blue. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Van Deemen, Adrian, and Noel P. Vergunst. 1998. “Empirical Evidence of Paradoxes of Voting in Dutch Elections.” Public Choice 97: 475–490
Van Deemen, Adrian. 1999. “The Probability of the Paradox of Voting for Weak Preference Orderings.” Social Choice and Welfare 16: 171–182
Wald, Alan M. 1987. The New York Intellectuals. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
Waldron, Jeremy. 1999. The Dignity of Legislation. Cambridge University Press
Walt, Stephen. 1999. “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies.” International Security 23: 5–48
Weale, Albert. 1984. “Review Article: Social Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory.” British Journal of Political Science. 14: 369–385
Weale, Albert. 1995. “William Riker and the Theory of Democracy.” Democratization 2: 377–395
Weber, Robert J. 1995. “Approval Voting.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 39–49
Weingast, Barry R. 1979. “A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms.” American Journal of Political Science 23: 245–262
Weingast, Barry R. 1998. “Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy.” In Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast, eds., Analytic Narratives. Princeton University Press
Wiebe, Robert H. 1995. Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy. University of Chicago Press
Wildavsky, Aaron. 1974. The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2nd edn. Boston: Little Brown
Wiles, Peter. 1969. “A Syndrome, not a Doctrine.” In Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., Populism: Its Meanings and Characteristics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Williamson, Oliver E., and Thomas J. Sargent. 1967. “Social Choice: A Probabilistic Approach.” The Economic Journal 77 (December): 797–813
Wittman, Donald. 1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure. University of Chicago Press
Wolff, Robert Paul. 1970. In Defense of Anarchism. New York: Harper and Row
Worsley, Peter. 1969. “The Concept of Populism.” In Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., Populism: Its Meanings and Characteristics. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Young, H. Peyton. 1974. “An Axiomatization of Borda's Rule.” Journal of Economic Theory 9: 43–52
Young, H. Peyton. 1988. “Condorcet's Theory of Voting.” American Political Science Review 82: 1231–1244
Young, H. Peyton. 1997. “Group Choice and Individual Judgments.” In Dennis C. Mueller, ed., Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge University Press
Zywicki, Todd J. 1994. “Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment.” Oregon Law Review 73: 1007–1055