Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology
By K. Brad Wray
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print Publication Year: 2011
Online Publication Date:October 2011
Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511997990.016
So where has the road that Kuhn traveled since the publication of Structure taken us?
One of my principal aims in this book has been to encourage a re-examination of Kuhn’s work. I believe that there are still important insights to gain from his work as we develop an epistemology of science. More precisely, I have argued that: (1) we need to move past the popular negative reading of Kuhn, and (2) in our efforts to understand his constructive contributions to philosophy of science we will benefit from attending to his later work, in particular, Kuhn’s mature notion of scientific revolutions and his emphasis on scientific specialization. For the most part, philosophers have seen Kuhn’s account of science as a threat to the rationality of science. Consequently, in their discussion of Kuhn’s work many philosophers have sought to show either how Kuhn is mistaken in his descriptive account of scientific change, or how he is mistaken about the normative implications of theory change in science. They have seldom sought positive insights from his work.
Reference Type: bibliography