1 - Introduction  pp. 1-33

Introduction

By Bertin Martens et al.

Image View Previous Chapter Next Chapter



THE SETTING

This book is about the institutions that guide the behaviour of persons involved in the implementation of foreign aid programmes. Following North (1990), it distinguishes between institutions and organisations. Institutions are the formal and informal rules of behaviour that constitute incentives for all agents involved in the aid delivery process; they affect the performance of foreign aid programmes. Organisations are the groups of persons that adhere to a particular set of these rules. In the case of aid, they include taxpayers and donor organisations, politicians, lobby groups, donor agencies and consultants in donor countries, and recipient organisations in beneficiary countries. This book analyses how these institutions affect the outcomes produced by organisations involved in the aid delivery process. It diverges from more traditional approaches to aid performance because it seeks to explain that performance in terms of incentives inside the aid delivery process, rather than recipient country policy performance. The proposed approach also differs from game-theoretic models that attempt to explain aid performance in terms of outcomes of strategic interactions between donors and recipients at macro-institutional level. This book goes down to micro-level decision-making processes and behaviour by agents working in donor agencies, subcontractors hired by these agencies and officials working in beneficiary country organisations. It will show that incentives and constraints for individual agents can diverge significantly from those of the organisation that they work for and thus lead to very different behavioural outcomes from those predicted by macro-institutional approaches.

1

Reference Title: references

Reference Type: bibliography

Aghion, Ph. and Tirole, J. (1997) Formal and real authority in organisations. Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 1–27
Becker, G. (1983) A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3), 371–400.
Boone, P. (1994) The Impact of Foreign Aid on Savings and Growth. Mimeo. London: London School of Economics
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D. (1996) Aid, Policies and Growth. Policy Research Working Paper 1777. Washington DC: World Bank
Burnside, C. and Dollar, D.(2000) Aid, policies and growth. American Economic Review, 90(4), 847–68
Carr, S. M., Eilish, 000, and MacLachlan, Malcolm (1998) Psychology of Aid. London: Routledge
Clague, Ch. (ed.) (1998) Institutions and Economic Development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Coase, R. (1937) The nature of the firm. Economica, 4, 386–405
Coase, R.(1960) The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44
Collier, P., Guillaumont, P. and S., and Gunning, J. W. (1997) Redesigning conditionality. World Development, 25(9), 1399–1407
Devarajan, S., Dollar D., and Holmgren, T. (1999) Aid and Reform in Africa. Draft summary report, World Bank Development Research Group working paper. Washington DC: World Bank
Dixit, A. (1997) Power of incentives in private versus public organisations. American Economic Review, 87(2), 378–382
Dollar, D. and Svensson, J. (1998) What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programs? Mimeo. Washington DC: World Bank
Downs, A. (1967) Inside bureaucracy. Rand Corporation research study. Boston, MA: Little & Brown
European Commission (1997) Phare Interim Evaluation Report. EC Evaluation Unit. Brussels: European Commission. Available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation
European Commission (1998) Evaluation of aspects of EU Development Aid to the Mediterranean Region. By Cowi, NEI and Andante. Brussels: European Commission. Available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation
European Commission (2000) The European Community External Co-operation Programmes: Policies, Management and Distribution. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation
Frey, B., Horn, H., Persson, T., and Schneider, F. (1985) A formulation and test of a simple model of World Bank behaviour. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 121(3), 438–447
Furubotn, E. and Richter, R. (1998) Institutions and Economic Theory: the contribution of the new institutional economics. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of lateral and vertical integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691–719
Haggard, S. and Webb, S. (eds.) (1994) Voting for Reform: democracy, political liberalisation and economic adjustment. New York: Oxford University Press
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991) Multitask principal–agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 7, 24–52
Killick, T. (1995) A principal–agent analysis of conditionality – a reader's digest. London: Overseas Development Institute
Laffont, J. J. and Tirole, J. (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement. Cambridge, MA: MIT press
Martimort, D. (1991) Multiple Principals as a Commitment Mechanism. Mimeo. Toulouse: University of Toulouse
Masten, S. and Williamson, O. (1999) The Economics of Transaction Costs. Cheltenham Edward Elgar
McCubbins, S.Noll, 000gast, 000 (1988) Administrative procedures as means of political control. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 3(2), 243–278
Mosley, P. (1997) Conditionality as a bargaining process: structural adjustment lending 1980–86. Princeton Essays in International Finance, 168
Murshed, S. and Sen, S. (1995) Aid conditionality and military expenditure reduction in developing countries: models of asymmetric information. Economic Journal, 105, 498–509
North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Ostrom, E., Gibson, C., Shivakumar, S., and Andersson, K. (2001) Aid, incentives and Sustainability: an institutional analysis of development co-operation. Mimeo, produced for the Swedish International Development Agency, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Pietrobelli, C. and Scarpa, C. (1992) Inducing efficiency in the use of foreign aid, Journal of Development Studies, 29(1), 72–92
Quarles van Ufford, P., Kruyt, D., and Downing, Th. (1988) The Hidden Crisis in Development: Development Bureaucracies. Amsterdam: Free University Press and United Nations University
Ranis, G. and Mahmood, S. (1992) The Political Economy of Development Policy Change. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell
Rodrik, D. (1997) Why is There Multilateral Lending. In the proceedings of the 1995 Annual Conference on Development Economics. Washington DC: World Bank
Simon, H. and Barnard, Ch. (1958) Administrative Behavior: a Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization. New York: Macmillan
Streeten, P. (1988) Conditionality: a double paradox. In: North-South Co-operation in Retrospect and Prospect. London: Routledge
Svensson, J. (1997) When is Foreign aid Policy Credible. Policy research working paper 1740. Washington DC: World Bank
Tirole, J. (1994) The internal organisation of government. Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 1–29
Tirole, J. (1999) Incomplete contracts: where do we stand? Econometrica, 67(4), 741–781
Trombetta, M. (1992) Does conditionality help? An agency approach to conditional development aid. Giornali Degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 51, 77–96
Tsikata, T. (1998) Aid Effectiveness: a Survey of Recent Empirical Literature. Washington DC: IMF Paper on Policy Analysis, PPAA/98/1
White, H. (1992) The macro-economic impact of development aid: a critical survey. Journal of Development Studies, 21(2), 163–240
Williamson, O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free press
Whitman, D. (1995) The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
World Bank (1997) World Development Report 1997. Washington DC: World Bank

Reference Title: references

Reference Type: bibliography

Anderlini, L. (1990) Manager-Managed Firms. Mimeo. Cambridge: University of Cambridge
Armstrong, M., S. Cowan and J. Vickers (1994) Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press
Bernheim, D. and Whinston, M. (1986) Common Agency. Econometrica, 54(4), 923
Browne, S. (1990) Foreign Aid in Practice. London: Pinter
Cassen, R. et al. (1994) Does Aid Work? Oxford: Clarendon Press
Chambers, R. (1983) Rural Development: Putting the Last First. Harlow: Longman
Committee of Independent Experts, (1999) First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism in the European Commission. Brussels: European Commission
De Waal, A. (1998) Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press
Dewatripont, M. et al. (2000) Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies. Mimeo. Toulouse: IDEI
Downs, A. (1967) Inside Bureaucracy. Rand Corporation research study. Boston, MA: Little and Brown
Holmstrom, B. (1982) Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective. In Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck. Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1991) Multi-task principal–agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 24–52
Kapur, D. et al. (1997) The World Bank: Its First Half Century. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution
Lake, A. (1989) Somoza Falling. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press
Lal, D. (1983) The Poverty of Development Economics. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Lele, U. (1990) Aid to African Agriculture: Lessons from Two Decades of Donor Experience. Washington, DC: The World Bank
Lipton, M. and J. Toye (1990) Does Aid Work In India? London: Routledge
Martimort, D. (1993) Multi-Principals as a Commitment Mechanism. Mimeo. University of Toulouse
Mason, E. and R. Asher (1973) The World Bank Since Bretton Woods. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution
Mookherjee, D. (1984): Optional Incentive Schemes with Many Agents. Review of Economic Studies, 51(3), 433–446
Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., and Toye, J. (1991) Aid and Power: the World Bank and Policy-Based Lending. London: Routledge
Neven, D., P. Papandropoulos and P. Seabright (1998) Trawling for Minnows: European Competition Policy and Agreements Between Firms. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Satyanarayan, S. (2000) Displacement and Compensation in Large Dam Projects. Ph.D. dissertation: University of Cambridge
Seabright, P. (1998) Multiple Talents for Multiple Tasks. Mimeo. University of Cambridge
Seabright, P. (2000) Skill versus judgment and the architecture of organizations. European Economic Review, 44(4–6), 856–868

Reference Title: references

Reference Type: bibliography

Binmore, Ken (1992) Fun and Games: a Text on Game Theory. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath
Claque, Christopher C. (ed.) (1997) Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and Governance in Less-Developed and Post-Socialist Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Evaluation Unit of the Directorate General for External Relations (DG 1A) of the European Commission (1997a) Phare: an Interim Evaluation. Brussels: European Commission
Evaluation Unit of the Directorate General for External Relations (DG 1A) of the European Commission (1997b) Tacis Interim Evaluation Synthesis Report. Brussels: European Commission
Granovetter, Mark S. (1985) Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–510
Grossman, Sanford, and Hart, Oliver (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, XCIV, 691–719
Hart, Oliver and Moore, John (1990) Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, XCVIII, 1119–58
Hart, Oliveret al. (1997) The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1127–61
Kanbur, Ravi, and Sandler, Todd (1999) The Future of Development Assistance: Common Pools and International Public Goods. Washington DC: Policy Essay No. 25. Overseas Development Council
Klugt, Arianne Beetsma-van der, Phedon Nicolaides, Christophe Soulard and Alexander Türk (1997) {An Assessment of the Approximation Process in Poland: the Importance of Coordination and Enforcement}. Paper prepared for the European Commission, Maastricht, March 1997
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Martens, Bertin (1998) Developing a Methodology for the Evaluation of Institution Building and Reform Projects. Directorate General 1A, Brussels: European Commission
North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Pietrobelli, Carlo and Scarpa, Carlo (1992). Inducing efficiency in the use of foreign aid: the case of incentive mechanisms. Journal of Development Studies, 29(1), 72–92.
Putzel, James (1998) The business of aid: transparency and accountability in European Union development assistance. Journal of Development Studies, 34(3), 71–96
Rudner, Martin (1991) Canada's official development assistance strategy: process, goals, priorities. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 12(1), 9–37
Salanié, Bernard (1997) The Economics of Contracts: a Primer. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Schmidt, Klaus M. (1996) The costs and benefits of privatization: an incomplete contracts approach. Journal of Law, Economics, Organization, (12)1, 1–24
Shapiro, Carl and Willig, Robert D. (1990) Economic rationales for the scope of privatization. In: Suleiman, Ezra and Waterbury, John (eds.) The Political Economy of Private Sector Reform and Privatization, pp. 55–87, Boulder, CO: Westerview
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. (1994) Politicians and firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 995–1026
Tirole, Jean (1994) The internal organization of government. Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 1–29
White, Howard and Morrissey, Oliver O. (1997) Conditionality when donor and recipient preferences vary. Journal of International Development, 9(4), 497–505

Reference Title: references

Reference Type: bibliography

Adelman, Irma and Morris, Cynthia Taft (1967) Society, Politics, and Economic Development. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
Ake, Claude (1996) Democracy and Development in Africa. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution
Akerlof, George A. (1980) A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 749–775
Alchian, Armen A. (1977/1965) Some economics of property rights. Il Politico, 30, 816–29. Reprinted in: Economic Forces at Work. pp. 127–149. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund
Aoki, Masahiko (1998) The Subjective Game Form and Institutional Evolution as Punctuated Equilibrium. Lecture at the Paris Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics
Ault, David E. and Rutman, Gilbert L. (1979) The development of individual rights to property in tribal Africa. Journal of Law and Economics, 22(1), 163–182
Baird, Douglas G., Gertner, Robert H., and Picker, Randal C. (1994) Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Banfield, Edward C. (1958) The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Chicago: The Free Press
Bardach, Eugene (1977) The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes A Law. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
Bauer, Peter T. and Yamey B. S. (1957) The Economics of Under-Developed Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Benson, Bruce L. (1988) Legal evolution in primitive societies. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 144 (5), 772–788
Bernstein, Lisa (1996) Merchant law in a merchant court: rethinking the code's search for immanent business norms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, 1765–1821
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, David and Welch, Ivo (1992) A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural changes as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100 (5), 992–1026
Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty – Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Burki, Shahid Javed and Perry, Guillermo E. (1998) Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter. Washington DC: The World Bank
Coleman, James S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
Collier, Paul and Gunning, Jan William (1999) Explaining African economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVII (1), 64–111
Cooter, Robert D. (1991) Inventing market property: the land courts of Papua New Guinea. Law & Society Review, 25(4)
Cooter, Robert D. (1997) The rule of state law and the rule-of-law state: economic analysis of the legal foundations of development. In: Bruno, M. and Pleskovic, B. (eds.) Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996. pp. 191–217. Washington DC: The World Bank
De Soto, Hernandez (1989) The Other Path. The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper and Row
Demsetz, Harold (1969) Information and efficiency: another viewpoint. Journal of Law and Economics, 12, 1–22
Dia, Mamadou (1996) Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond. Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions. Washington, DC: The World Bank
Dollar, David and Svensson, Jakob (1998) What Explains the Success or Failure of Structural Adjustment Programs? World Bank Working Paper Series. Washington DC: World Bank
Downs, Anthony (1967/1994) Inside Bureaucracy. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press
Easterly, William and Levine, Ross (1997) Africa's growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4), 1203–1250
Ellickson, Robert C. (1991) Order without Law. How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
Elster, Jon (1989) The Cement of Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Ensminger, Jean (1992) Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Frank, Robert H. (1988) Passions Within Reason – The Strategic Role of Emotions. New York: W. W. Norton & Company
Furubotn, Eirik G. and Richter, Rudolf (1997) Institutions and Economic Theory. The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
Geiger, Theodor (1964) Vorstudien zu einer Soziologie des Rechts. Neuwied: Luchterhand
Goldschmidt, W. (1951) Ethics and the Structure of Society: an Ethnological Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge. American Anthropologist, 53, 506–524
Granovetter, Mark (1985) Economic action, social structure, and embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481–510
Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus (1961) The Concept of Law. London: Oxford University Press
Haug, Marie R. (1967) Social and cultural pluralism as a concept in social system analysis. American Journal of Sociology, 73, 294–304
Hayek, Friedrich August (1973/1993): Law, Legislation and Liberty. Volume 1 Rules and Order. Padstow: T. J. Press Ltd
Hayek, Friedrich August (1976/1993): Law, Legislation and Liberty. Volume 2 The Mirage of Social Justice. Padstow: T. J. Press Ltd
Hayek, Friedrich August (1979/1993): Law, Legislation and Liberty. Volume 3 The Political Order of a Free People. Padstow: T. J. Press Ltd
Holcombe, Randall G. (1994) The Economic Foundations of Government. New York: New York University Press
Hume, David (1896/1928) A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press
Kasper, Wolfgang and Streit, Manfred E. (1998) Institutional Economics. Social Order and Public Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Kimenyi, Mwangi S. (1997) Ethnic Diversity, Liberty and the State. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Knack, Stephen and Keefer, Philip (1997) Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4), 1251–1288
Knight, Jack (1992) Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kuran, Timur (1998) Ethnic norms and their transformation through reputational cascades. Journal of Legal Studies, XXVII, 623–659
La Porta, Rafaelet al. (1997) Trust in large organizations. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 87 (2), 333–338
Laffont, Jean-Jaques and Rochet, Jean-Charles (1997) Collusion in organizations. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99 (4), 485–495
Laffont, Jean-Jaques and Tirole, Jean (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge: The MIT Press
Luhmann, Niklas (1969/1993) Legitimation durch Verfahren. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
Mackaay, Ejan (1998) Emergence of legal rules. In: Newman, P. (Ed): The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. pp. 29–34 London: Macmillan Reference Limited
Malinowski, Bonislaw (1926) Crime and Custom in Savage Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Marris, P. and Somerset, A. (1971) African Businessmen. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Mookherjee, Dilip and Png, I. P. L. (1995) Corruptible law enforcers: how should they be compensated? The Economic Journal, 105, 145–159
Moore, Sally Falk (1986) Social Facts and Fabricants: Customary Law in Kilimanjaro 1880–1980. New York: Cambridge University Press
Naím, Moisés (1995) Latin America's Journey to the Market. From Macroeconomic Shocks to Institutional Therapy. San Francisco: ICS Press
North, Douglass C. (1981) Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc
North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press
Ostrom, E. (1986) An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice, 48, 3–25
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Pejovich, Svetozar (1997): Law, Tradition, and the Transition in Eastern Europe. The Independent Review, II (2), 243–254
Pinckney, Thomas C. and Kimuyu, Peter K. (1994): Land tenure reform in East Africa: good, bad or unimportant. Journal of African Economies, 3, 1–28
Platteau, Jean-Philippe (1996) Traditional Sharing Norms as an Obstacle to Economic Growth in Tribal Societies. Faculté des Sciences économiques et sociales, Centre de Recherche en Economie du Développement. Namur: Facultes Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix
Popisil, L. (1958) Kapauka Papuans and their Law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Posner, E. (1996a) The regulation of groups: the influence of legal and nonlegal sanctions on collective action. University of Chicago Law Review, 63 (133), 133–197
Posner, E. (1996b) Law, economics, and inefficient norms. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, 1697–1744
Posner, Richard A. (1980) A theory of primitive society with special reference to Law. Journal of Law and Economics, XXIII (1), 1–53
Posner, Richard A. (1992) Economic Analysis of Law. Boston, Toronto, London: Little, Brown and Company
Putnam, Robert (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
Reynolds, Lloyd G. (1985) Economic Growth in the Third World, 1850–1980. New Haven: Yale University Press
Romer, David (1984) The theory of social custom: a modification and some extensions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, XCIX (4), 717-727
Röpke, Wilhelm (1950) The Social Crisis of Our Time. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1985) Inalienability and the theory of property rights. Columbia Law Review, 85 (5), 931–969
Temple, Jonathan and Johnson, Paul A. (1998) Social capability and economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 965–990
Thalheim, K. C. (1955) Zum Problem der Einheitlichkeit der Wirtschaftspolitik. pp. 577–587. In: Muhs K. (ed.): Festgabe für Georg Jahn. Berlin
Thomas, John W. and Grindle, Merilee S. (1990) After the decision: implementing policy reforms in developing countries. World Development, 18 (8), 1163–1181
Tirole, Jean (1986) Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 2 (2), 181–214
Tirole, Jean (1992) Collusion and the theory of organizations. pp. 151–206. In: Laffont, J.-J. (ed): Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Tuchtfeldt, Egon (1960) Zur Frage der Systemkonformität wirtschaftspolitischer Maβnahmen. pp. 203–238. In. H.-J. Seraphim (ed.) Zur Grundlegung wirtschaftspolitischer Konzeptionen. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot
Tyler, Tom R. (1990) Why People Obey the Law. New Haven: Yale University Press
Ullman-Margalit, Edna (1978) The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Voigt, Stefan and Kiwit, Daniel (1998) The role and evolution of beliefs, habits, moral norms, and institutions. pp. 83–108 in: Harbert Giersch (ed.) The Merits and Limits of Markets. Berlin: Springer
Weber, Max (1905/1993) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Routledge
Wegner, Gerhard (1997) Economic policy from an evolutionary perspective: a new approach. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 153 (3), 485–509
Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books
Witt, Ulrich (1989) The evolution of economic institutions as a propagating process. Public Choice, 62, 155–172
Witt, Ulrich (1999) Multiple equilibria, critical masses, and institutional change: the coup d' état problem. pp. 286–299. In: Bowles, S. et al. (eds.) The Politics and Economics of Power. London, New York: Routledge

Reference Title: references

Reference Type: bibliography

Aghion, Ph. and Tirole, J. (1997) Formal and real authority in organisations. Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 1–29.
Becker, G. (1983) A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 63, 371–400
DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1993) The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in the organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–160
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper
Downs, A. (1967) Inside Bureaucracies. Rand Corporation Research Study. Boston, MA: Little & Brown
Frey, B. (1985) A formulation and test of a simple model of World Bank behaviour. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 121(3), 438–447
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991) Multitask principal–agent analysis: incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 7(s), 24–52
Johnson, R. and Libecap, G. (1999) Information distortion and competitive remedies in government transfer programs: the case of ethanol. Paper presented at the ISNIE 1999 conference
Rodrik, D. (1996) Why is There Multilateral Lending? In Proceedings of the 1995 Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington, DC: World Bank
Tirole, J. (1994) The internal organisation of government. Oxford Economic Papers, 46, 1–29
Wittman, D. (1995) The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press